

golia. For more than a year Chinese troops and diplomacy succeeded in reestablishing Chinese authority at Urga. Early in 1921, however, Baron Ungern, a picturesque anti-Communist Russian, captured the city and brought Chinese rule to an end. In the summer of 1921, he in turn was driven out by Soviet troops, and a government was set up which was friendly to Moscow and which, for most practical purposes, became one of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. While, by the treaty of May 31st, 1924, Soviet Russia recognized Outer Mongolia as "an integral part of the Republic of China," it regarded Outer Mongolia as autonomous, entitled to freedom from Chinese interference in its foreign affairs, and opened direct relations with it. The influence of China became negligible and that of Soviet Russia dominant.

In some other phases of its relations with Russia China had better success. For a time after the Russian revolution, the Czarist diplomatic and consular staffs continued to function in China, supported by the Boxer indemnity. Many adherents of the old regime—"White Russians"—took refuge in China. In August, 1920, China suspended Boxer indemnity payments to Russians, the following month it withdrew its recognition of the Czarist officials within its borders, and before long the Russian post offices in China were closed. While, theoretically, the old treaties with Russia were intact, in practice Russians were deprived of their extraterritorial privileges. In 1919 the Soviets issued a manifesto offering to negotiate with China on the basis of the renunciation of all special privileges of Russia and Russians in China, the cancellation of further payments on the Boxer in-

demnity, the restoration to China, without compensation, of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the mines and forests acquired by the Czar's government from China, and the return of territory seized by the former regime. This action of Moscow was not from such disinterested generosity as might at first appear. It was good policy. Russia hoped for the spread of the Communist revolution into the Far East. Much of what Moscow proposed to give up it no longer possessed, and its surrender of extraterritoriality would injure chiefly the Russian "Whites"—on whom the Soviets were quite happy to inflict suffering.

When it came to actual negotiations, Soviet Russia proved un